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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
RAYMOND H. ROSS and BETTY
ROSS,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
LLOYD N. OLSON and FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY
OF MARYLAND, a corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.

12143

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This was an action filed by plaintiffs against
defendants for the recovery of a $3,500.00 downpayment made pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate
Contract based upon the grounds that defendant
Lloyd N. Olson made fraudulent misrepresentations
to induce plaintiffs to enter into said agreement and
pay the $3,500.00 down-payment.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Lower Court held that defendant Lloyd N.
Olson, a real estate broker bonded by the defendant
surety company made fraudulent misrepresentations
to plaintiffs that Futura Development and Investment Corp. "owned" property which it did not in
1

fact mvn. The Court held that the defendant Fidelity
and Deposit Company of
was therefor·1,
liable on its bond to plaintiff in the sum of Sl,180.0fl
because defendant Lloyd X. Olson's conduct in making the rnisrepresentations and disbursing the $3,500.00 dmYn-payment to Futura constituted a course
of dishonest dealings. The Court entered judgmem
ag2.inst defendant Lloyd X. Olson in the sum of $4,315.07 and held that said indebtedness was net discharged and is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
RELIEF SOVGHT OX APPEAL
Defendants seek the re,·ersal of the decision and
judgment of the Lower Court and an order and decree
finding defendants not lir.ble to plaintiffs.
OF F_-\.CTS
On _-\.ugust 29. 1963
De,·elopment and
InYestment Corporation hereinafter referred to as
Futura, entered into an Earnest -:\foney Receipt and
Offer to Purchase approximately fotff and one-half
acres of real property located in :\Iurray. Ctah, from
Esther R. Glenn bY and through her r2al estate agent.
Duffin Realty Co;npany. (
D-1-1) Futura made
its offer to purchase the property from Glenn subject
to obtaining re-zoning of the property. (Ex.
Application was made with -:\Iurray City for rezoning of the property and the buyer Furnra obtained
the :;e1Tices L1f Gardner En6neeriI1g to sulxfoide the
p1'\.1perty and prepare a
l Ex. D--1) for
missitm w ).lurray City fL1r app1'\.wal. (R. 160, l6il
.")

Re-zoning was obtained and the plot plan was apprO\'ed by the lVI urray City Planning and Zoning
Commission Nm·emb2r 4, 1963. (Ex. D-11)
On the strength of the Earnest Money Agreement to purchase the four and one-half acres of property, Futura by and through its real estate agent
Lloyd N. Olson Realty entered into an Earnest Money
Agreement to sell one of the Lots, Lot No. 3, to
plaintiffs Raymond H. and Betty Ross. This agreement was entered into on October 2, 1963. (Ex. D-6)
This agreement was made subject to seller obtaining
rezoning and plat approval by the Murray City. (Ex.
D-6) (R 218, 219)
Exactly one day after the Murray City Planing and Zoning Commission had approved the rezoning and the plat, plaintiffs entered into a Uniform
Real Estate Contract to purchase Lot No. 3 from
Futura. (Ex. P-1)
Plaintiff testified that he bought Lot No. 3 after
being told by Olson that Futura either had "bought"
the property, or they "owned" it. See the discussion
of these terms under Appellant's Argument, POINT
1.
Plaintiffs paid the sum of $3,500.00 as a downpayment to
Olson Realty. After real estate commissions had been paid to the real estate saleswoman
and Olson Realty, the balance of the $3,500.00 was
delfrered by Olson Realty to Futura Development
Im·estmE:nt Corporation. (Ex. D-22) ( R. 220,
221)

App1·o:::irnatcly tY:o months after foe said Uniform Real Estate Contract had been signed by Futura and plaintiffs, Esther R. Glenn, the individual
selling the property to Futura informed Futura
through her attorney, Dwight King, that she wanted
more security protection on the sale of the propert\'
and interest on unpaid balances which requirement's
her attorney stated were not clearly spelled cut in
the Earnest Money Agreement. (Ex. D-11) (R 168)
After correspondence between Dwight King and
Alton Lund, the attorney for Futura, a contract
was prepared by Alton Lund which was forwarded
to Dwight King for closing on April 1, 1964 as provided by the Earnest Money Agreement. Mr. King
testified that he did not believe the contract had
arrived on April 1, 1964 and for that and oth81'
reasons he claimed there wa,s a breach of the agreement and refused to close the real estate contract
between Esther Glenn as seller and Futura as buyer.
(See the entire testimony of Dwight King commencing at R 166 through R 173.)
Futura ultimately lost the property and was
unable to deliver possession of Lot #3 to plaintiffs.
and was unable to repay the $3,500.00.
Plaintiffs during the month of January or February, 1964 became aware that Futura did not own
the property and that Mrs. Glenn would not sell the
property to Futura. (R 86, 87)
Esther Glenn did not close the real estate trans·
4

action with Futura and Futura was therefcre unable
to deliver title to plaintiffs Raymond H. and Betty
Ross. Futura Corporation was unable to repay
$3,500.00 to plaintiffs and so the officers of the
Corporation, Larry Birch ( R 176, 177), Curtis Pettit (R 195) and Lloyd N. Olson (R 206) felt a moral
responsibility to repay the money to plaintiffs and
subsequently through various transactions tendered
several hundred dollars to plaintiffs in return for
their down-payment for the property.
Larry Birch allowed plaintiffs to charge gas at
the service station owned and operated by Larry
Birch. ( R 176, 177) The charges totaled $375.00
as stipulated by plaintiffs and defendants. Larry
Birch and Curtis Pettit in addition paid $100.00 each
to Raymond and Betty Ross.
Lloyd N. Olson agreed to sell to plaintiffs a
house and allow plaintiffs to retain the entire commission to be paid to Lloyd N. Olson as re-payment
for the share of the moral obligation Lloyd N. Olson
felt existed and was due plaintiffs. ( R 206, 207)
Raymond H. Ross entered into an Earnest Money
Agreement to purchase the home, and signed a promissory note in the sum of $600.00 to secure his rights
in the property. He subsequently defaulted in the
Earnest Money Agreement. (R 114, 115, 207) (Ex
D-7)

Subsequently all three principals in Futura filed
their petitions in bankruptcy.
5

Plaintiffs commenced this action :Jgainst Llc,.J
N. Olson as the real estate broker claiming ( 1) tl;at
Lloyd N. Olson had falsely represented foat Futura
had a contract to acquire the property from Esther
Glenn and (2) that Futura did not have an
Money Agreement to purchase the prope:L'ty frcm
Esther Glenn and as a result had committed frand
against the plaintiffs rind ( 3) that inasrnuc'.1
fraud had been committed, defendant Lloyd N.
Olson was not discharged from this obliP"ation b\·
his discharge in bankruptcy.
0

•

ARGUMENT
POINT NUMBER 1
PLAINTIFFS HAVE THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING ALL OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF
FRAUD BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
(a) ALL OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF
FRAUD MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY PLAINTIFF.

Plaintiff originally filed his Ccrnplaint alleging
that defendant Olsen misrepresented to plaintiff
that Futura had a contract to acquire the property
known at Lot #3, Futura Arms Subdi·vision and
that said statement was false. The plaintiff subsequently amended his Complaint during the trial but
did not change his allegaions concerning fraud.
At the conclusion of the presentation of plaintiffs and defendants evidence the plaintiff mond
for the Court to grant him leave to amend his Com6

plaint to include an alternative theory of fraud, towit: That defendant Olson had represented to plaintiff that Future "owned" Lot #3, Futura Arms
Subdivision and that said representation was false
and therefore fraudulent.
The evidence conclusively established that Futura did have a contract (Ex. D-6) to acquire Futura
Arms Subdivision. After the amendment to the Complaint was granted defendants did not have an opportunity to defend the action brought against them
rm the r..ew theory which was raised after the close
of the presentation of all the evidence. The trial
Court made no findings or conclusions with respect
to the theory of fraud alleged in plaintiff's original
Complaint or amended Complaint and based its findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment upon
the theory plaintiffs set forth in their second amended Complaint filed at the conclusion of the trial,
to-wit: that it was fraudulent to say that Futura
had owned the property. (R 53)
In the case of Pace vs. Parrish, 122 Utah 141,
247 P. 2nd 273 at 27 4 this Court held:
"This being an action in deceit based upon
fraudulent misrepresentations, the burden
was upon plaintiffs to prove all of the essential elements thereof. These are: ( 1) That
a representation was made; ( 2) concerning
a presently existing material fact; ( 3) which
was false; ( 4) which the representor either
(a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly,
7

knowi!lg that he had insufficien! knowledge
on which to base such represent:Jt10n · (5) for
the
of inducing the other pa;ty to act
upon it; ( 6)
the other l?3:rty, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity· (7)
did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was
induced to act; ( 9) to his injury and damage."
In Lawrence vs. Ward, 5 Utah 2d 257, 300 P.2d
619, this Court discussed an automobile dealei''s liability on his bond and stated as follows:
"Contributory negligence is not a defense to
an action for fraud, but plaintiff must prove
a material, false representation, an intention
that the representation should be acted on in
the manner contemplated; the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement, his reliance upon it, his right to rely and his proximate injury. Oberg v. Sanders, 111 Utah 507,
184 P.2d 299."
An examination of the trial court's findings of
fact and conclusions of law reveals that the trial
court failed to make any findings on several of the
essential elements of fraud. The judgment entered
by the trial court is not supported by sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.
In particular this Court's attention is drawn
to the fact that there is no finding that defendant
Olson knowingly made a false statement to induc?
plaintiff to enter into the Uniform Real Estat 9
Agreement. The trial Court did not make a finding
that plaintiffs acted reasonably and in ignorance of
8

the falsity of the statement. The testimony of the
plainiff himself on direct examination disclosed
that plaintiff knew Futura did not have a clear title
to the property.
"Q.

Now the contract states, Mr. Ross, in
clause number 6, I quote:
'It is understood that there presently
exists an obligation against said property
in favor of Esther Glenn with an unpaid
balance of $3,503.72, as of November 5,
1963.'
Were you aware of that clause when you
signed the contract?

A.

Yes, I was. I knew it was on the contract,
yes.

Q.

What explanation was given you?

A.

There was an obligation against the
property owned (owed, sic.) to Mrs.
Glenn by the Futura Development Company.
What did you understand that to mean?
Well, Mr. Olson - I took Mr. Olson at
his word. I saw there was an obligation
against the property." (R 83, 84)

Q.
A.

This admission by plaintiff construed together
with his testimony that Olson told him that Futura
was buying the property, or owned it ( R 76, 77) ,
indicates that plaintiff knew Futura was buying the
Pl'operty and that the word "owned," only meant
9

owning it frcm a purchaser's point cf view, not
outright ownership - fully paid for.
(b) PLAINTIFFS BURDEN OF PROOF IS TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF FRAUD BY CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

Even if this Court were to overlook the fact
that the Lower Court did not make findings on each
and every essential element of fraud the evidenc2
itself could not sustain such findings even if the/
had been made and entered by the trial Court.
The only witness called to establish plaintiff's
case of fraud was the plaintiff Raymond Ress himself. Although one other witness was called his testimony was not on material items with which the findings and conclusions and judgment are concerned.
We must therefore look to the testimony of plaintiff
as the sole evidence concerning the allegations 1112cl:i
in plaintiff's second amended Complaint concerning
the alleged fraudulent conduct of defendant Olsen.
The record discloses the fallowing weaknesses of
plaintiffs testimony and the following contradictiom
to plaintiff"s allegations.
1. Olson denied having stated to plaintiff that
Futura "owned" Lot #3. (R 209) Gloria Oldham
testified that she did not hear defendant Olson state
that Future "owned" Lot #3. ( R148) Mrs. Oldham
testified that she personally told the plaintiff Futuni
was buying the property. Plaintiff testified on direct
examination as follows:
10

"A.

He informed me that they were attempting to get the re-zoining on the property,
and that if they could do this, they were
buying the property.
THE COURT: Would buy what property?
THE WITNESS: Buy this large parcel of land, your Honor, and it involved
10 or 15 multiple unit lots.

Q.

\Vhat did they tell you when they came
back?

A.

They said that they had the re-zoning accomplished, and that they owned the property.

Q.

This was some time ago, this conversation
took place, I realize about seven years,
but are you sure that those are the words
he used, they owned the property?

A.

Yes, they had bought the property, yes,
the corporation - they owned the property.
THE COURT: I did not understand
that last sentence it wasn't clear. Restate it.
A. That the corpora ti on did own the property.
Q. (Mr. Day) They had bought the property
from-" (R 76, 77)
Plaintiff's testimony on cross-examination was
as follows:
11

"The first meeting of M1·. Olson I was inf on11ed the l'e-zoning w2.s to be accomplis!1!Cd,
and that Futura Development was going to
purchase the property.

The second time when he came back, as I recall
it was the second or third time, he informed
me that Futura Development did own tk
property, and the re-zoining had been acccmplished, and they did own the property.
·

Q.

Did he use the word "own"; is
the
word you used to describe the conversation?
A. That they had bought the property.
Q. Were those his words?
A. Well I don't exactly - I cannot rernernber exactly which words." (R 101, 102) ·
The above quoted testimony of plaintiff dis;:loses
that plaintiff did not recall whether Olson had said
Futura had bought the property or "owned" the
property. Mr. Ross testified as follows:
1

Did he tell you after the first meeting,
from that point forward, that he owned
the property?
A. That Future had purchased the property,
yes." ( R 100)
Plaintiff had the burden of establishing by clear
and convincing evidence that defendant Olson actually made a false representation, knowing it to be
false, with intent to deceive. Defendants submit:
"Q.

1. That in the first place, Ross used the words
12

interchangeably as though "bought the property"
and "owned the property" meant the same thing. In
common usage, a party is an owner of the property
at the time he commences to buy it, either by an
Earnest Money Agreement or through a Uniform
Real Estate Contract signed by the seller.
2. A case of fraud cannot possibly be made
cut against Olson that he fraudulently stated that
Futura owned the property when he presented Ross
with a Uniform Real Estate Contract which Ross
read and understood to mean that his purchase was
subject to an obligation existing against said property in favor of Esther Glenn. Ross was a knowledgeable person in real estate matters. His opening
testimony was that he was in financial difficulty,
and so he was refinancing his house to gain $10,000
cash out of their equity. (R 75 and 76)
3. In September and October of 1963, Futura
Development and Investment Corporation had
bought the property, and it was not until April 1,
1964, that Esther Glenn breached her agreement to
sell to Futura. This Court must continue to make a
distinction between a false representation made with
intent to deceive and a broken promise as to a future
event. In State vs. Bruce, 1 Utah 2d 136, 262 P.2d
960, this Court stated:
"This amounts to a promise to be performed
in the future. Obviously such a promise may
be made in good faith, but plans go awry, unexpected or uncontrollable events intervene,
13

or a ??na fide change of mind occurs, <my
of which would negative the existence of an
intent to defraud at the time the check was
passed, thus eliminating an element essential
to c.onstitute the crime. Such reasoning is th 2
basis of the general rule that a prnrnis2 cf
performance in the future will usually not
support a charge of fraud. We so held wit:i
respect to a postdated check in the case of
State v. Trogstad."
This principal that fraud cannot be b::ised up:m
failure to perform a future promise was very judiciously expressed by this Court in Fleming v. Fleming-Felt Company, 7 Utah 2d 293, 323 P.2d 712,
where the Court stated :
"In respect to the issue of fraud we are
constrained to agree with the defendants that
the trial Court was in error. One of its essential elements is the knowing false
tion, of a presently existing material /act,
which must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. This presents difficulties when it
requires proof of a state of mind: in this
stance a preconceived design on the part of
Felts not to keep their promise to retire and
turn over the management of the business
the plaintiff. It is not to be gainsaid t?at
under some circumstances it may be
to show that a promisor has a preconceived
determination not to perform. But the me1:e
fact that the Felts had not performed t.he1l'
promise and retired at the time the diff1culties arose is not sufficient to do so." (Empha·
sis added)
14
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I

It is undisputed in this case that Futura had

bought the property at the time of sale to plaintiff,
and that Olson, as one of the principals in Futura
Corporation, could honestly represent that Futura
owned it until Mrs. Glenn reneged on her contract.
In today's common everyday language it is not
necessary for a person to have clear and uncontested
title to a piece of property before he is authorized
to say he owns the property or has purchased the
property.
Plaintiff is bound by the Version of his testimony that Olson said he had "bought" the property,
as distinguished from the findings of fact that Olson
represented that Futura "owned" the property. The
trial Court should find the testimony to be true as
bears most strongly against the conflict in testimony
given by the plaintiff. Fowler vs. Plewsant Valley
Cool Co., 16 Utah 348, 52 Pac. 594; Benson vs. Denver Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 4 Utah
2d 38, 286 P.2d 790; De Vas vs. Noble, 13 Utah 2d
133, 369 P.2d 290. In other words, plaintiffs testimony is no stronger than the weakest of two conflicting versions of the facts presented by plaintiff.
The trial Court should have been obliged to
find that plaintiff at best established that defendant
Olson had stated that Futura had purchased the
property.
It was essential in plaintiff's burden of proof
that he establish that he relied upon a false state15

ment reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity. At
this point this Court's attention is drawn to thi
fact that plaintiff being in the building business harl
been involved in several real estate transactions arnl
was not totally ignorant of real estate matteis.
(R 111)

As has been previously cited in this brief
plaintiff Ross testified he knew at the time of thr
signing of the Uniform Real Estate Agreement th 2,t
there was an obligation in favor of Esther Glenn.
Inasmuch as plaintiff Ross knew there was an obligation in favor of Esther Glenn when he signed the
Uniform Real Estate Contract he did not nor could
he have relied in any way upon any statement that
may have been previously made that Futura "owned''
the property if plaintiff Ross interpreted the us,
of the word owned to mean title free and clear of
any and all encumbrances. The word "owned" if
defendant Olson used said word could have meant
to plaintiff no more than it was intended if it
made: namely, that Futura had acquired rights ii!
said property.

In the common ordinary use of the worrl pm· :
chased and owned it would certaintly not be consL:- I
ered a deliberate lie for a person to say that he
/
his house even though it is being purchased on ccu· i
tract. It would not be a deliberate lie for an ind: /
vi dual to say he had purchased the home even thoug · I
that home were encumbered by a mortgage to a haih i
16

or to a previous party including a vendor.

1

The
essence of plaintiff's case although it is not stated
but
inferred is that defendant used the word
·'ow:aed" and that plaintiffs relied upon and had
the right to rely upon the understanding of said
word meaning title free and clear of any and all
encumbrances or clouds. Inasmuch as plaintiff Ross
knew when he signed the Uniform Real Estate Contract that Lot #3 had an encumbrance on it in favor
of Esther Glenn he could not have relied upon the
use of the word "owned" to mean title free and
clear of any and all encumbrances or clouds but could
at best have relied upon the use of such word to
mean that .Futura had an interest in the property.
ln the case of Owens v. Nemeyer, 62 Utah 580,
221 P. 160, a purchaser of land on a contract sued
the vendor for recission of the contract on the ground
that the vendor of 'the property had stated '''he was the
owner of the fee-simple title." Admittedly the vendor did not have a fee simple title but had a conrrnct to acquire the fee-simple title from a third
party upon payment of an additional sum of money.
In regard to the vendor this Court stated as
follows:

"\Ve think that, according to the definition of
the term "owner" of land, as that term is
understood and applied by the Courts, appellant was the owner at the time he entered into
the contract, and hence had a legal right to
enter into valid contract of sale.
In referring to the circumstances under
17

which one may be considered the owner 0r
land and may enter into a valid contract
sell and agree to convey the same without
being open to the charge of misrepresentation
the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in McNui.1; c.
Campbell, 81 Neb. 754, 116 N.vV. 6ril, Sccia:
'Upon the question of false representc-Jions
as to the ownership of the land, it is admitted that the legal title was in Pritchard.'
The Court then states that Pritchai·d harl
given a lease and an option to purchase to t!L
defendant in that action, who had ente1·ed in tu
an agreement to sell as the owner, precisely
as the appellant did in the instant case. Tlk
Court then proceeds:
'When one is so situated with reference tn
a tract of land that he can acquire the title
thereto either by the voluntary act of th:>
parties holding the title or by
at law or in equity, he is in a position tu
make a valid agreement for the sale thereof' citing cases.
In every executory contract for the sale of
land, there is an implied condition that tl:c·
title of the vendor is good, and that he will
tr an sf er to the purchaser by his deed conveyance a title unincumbered and without
defect; but the vendor sufficiently
with this obligation if he is able to give a
title at the time when, by the terms of hb
con tract of sale, he is required to make tilt
conveyance, and the mere fact that the nndor's title was defective or incumbered at the
date of the contract does not give
plll'chaser the right to recover the deposit marl.
18

by him.
\Ve likewise quote the headnote to the case of
Crurnp v. Schneider, 246 Fed. 225, 158 C.C.A.
385.
'Where married men contracted to sell land,
title to which was held by their wives, although the evidence indicated that they
were not the owners, the purchaser, not having been injured, and a deed from the wives
having been tendered, cannot defeat the contraet on the ground that it was induced by
fraudulent representations'."
In the case at hand Futura had a contract to
acquire the fee-simple title to the land. Under the
rules set forth in the case previously cited, Olson
had the right to say Futura ("owned" or) had
bought the property.
We realize plaintiff had lost some money in the
real estate transaction. Plaintiff is in effect attempting to hold a real estate broker liable on the
grounds of fraud as a result of the failure of a vendor to be able to deliver title to property at a date
subsequent to the real estate transaction. This
amounts to holding a real estate broker liable on the
grounds of fraud for failure of a vendor to perform
a future promise. Plaintiff did not sue Futura Development Company. Plaintiff sued defendant Olson
on the grounds that defendant Olson as a real estate
broker committed fraud by stating that the vendor
Futura "owned" Lot #3.
It is obvious plaintiff did not establish his case
19

against defendant Olson. In the case of Universal
C.l.T. Credit Corporation -vs. Sohm, 15 Utah 2d 262
'
391 P.2d 293 this Court held:
"In our opinion the only clear and convincinrr
aspect of this case is that the alleged wilful
deceit clearly was not proved by a clear preponderance of the evidence. The trial Court
obviously was convinced that plaintiff should
recover, but such conclusion, in our opinion,
could not have been arrived at by clear a11;]
convincing evidence adduced at the trial, so
that the Court's Finding # 3 with respect to
wilful and intentional deceit appears to be
an unwarranted conclusion based on the facts
of this case.
To recover, the plaintiff must present facts to
demonstrate that Nickles, appliance dealer,
and/or his agent intentionally, wilfully, clearly and convincingly practiced a fraud 011
plaintiffs by way of telling them delib2ratc
lies."
POINT NO. 2
AN ACTION FOR RELIEF ON THE GROUND OF
FRAUD OR MISTAKE MUST BE COMMENCED WITHIN THREE YEARS AFTER THE DISCOVERY OF THE
FRAUD BY THE AGGRIEVED PARTY.

The Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-26
provides:
"78-12-26. Within three years:
(3) An action for relief on the
?f
fraud or mistake; but the cause of action 111
such case shall not be deemed to have accrued
20

until the discovery by the aggrieved party of
the facts constituting the fraud or mistake."
The plaintiff testified that he contacted Esther
Glenn personally and she told plaintiff she was not
going to complete the real estate transaction with
Futura. Plaintiff then testified as follows:
"Q. So you would have known in March of
1964, then, that title could not be delivered to you; is that correct?
A. Before March, yes.
Q. You had known before March title could
not be delivered to you?
A. Yes.
Q. So then, before March of 1964 you were
aware title could not be delivered to you
on Lot #3, and it was at that time that
you made demand upon Mr. Olson for the
return of your Earnest Money; is that
correct?
A. That is correct." (R 140, 141)
On direct examination during plaintiff's rebuttal, plaintiff Ross testified again:
"A. This arose around February, when I
first learned that Futura Development
did not own the property.... " (R 252)
Plaintiff did not file his Complaint until April
27, 1967 as indicated by the filing date stamp on
the Complaint.
Plaintiff did not commence his action within
three years of the date of the discovery of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake as indicated by
his testimony that by March of 1963 he knew title
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could not be delivered by Futura. The Court enterer!
no findings on this matter but made a conclusion of
law paragraph 4 as follows: "Plaintiffs commenc 2d
their action to recover said $3,676.00 within the
period of the Statute of Limitations." Such a conclusion is not supported by a finding. And in fact,
no finding could have been made to support such a
conclusion inasmuch as plaintiff clearly commenc 2d
his action 39 months after plaintiff was told by
Esther Glenn that title would not be forthcoming.
POINT NO. 3
THE CONDUCT OF LLOYD N. OLSON AS THE
REAL ESTATE BROKER IN DISBURSING THE $3,500.00 DEPOSIT TO FUTURA DID NOT CONSTITUTE
A COURSE OF DISHONEST DEALINGS.

Plaintiff's second amended Complaint makes no
allegations that plaintiff is entitled to proceed
against the defendant bonding company on the
grounds of a course of dishonest dealings. Such a
theory is wholly outside the case and not a part of
the pleading. This issue was never raised by plain·
tiff by pleading or during the course of the trial.
The first mention of this point was during the final
argument offered by plaintiff's attorney.
Once again the defendants found themselves in
a peculiar circumstance in which an issue which
not raised by the pleadings and which was not of·
fered in evidence or testimony eventually becanw !
part of the findings of fact and conclusions of law.
At no time did plaintiff offer any testimony or
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evidence concerning procedures of the real estate
practice in the State of Utah. At no time did plaintiff offer any testimony or evidence to show that
failure on the part of the real estate broker to hold
a down-payment on a Uniform Real Estate Contract
in escrow or trust until final deed was delivered constituted a course of dishonest dealings. If the plaintiff would have desired the down-payment to be held
in escrow it was his responsibility to so indicate
but this issue is wholly outside of the pleadings. If
defendants would have been aware at the time of
the trial that such a matter would become part of
the findings of fact and conclusions of law plaintiff
would have taken its opportunity to present evidence
showing that such conduct on the part of a broker
was not "dishonest dealings."
The finding and conclusion entered by the trial
Court on this particular point is unsupported by
any testimony or evidence and it was prejudicial to
the defendants for the trial Court to allow said issue
to enter into the findinsg of fact and conclusions of
lctw without any prior warning to defandants other
than a few comments made by plaintiff's attorney
during his final argument.
There was no testimony or evidence offered to
show that defendant Olson knew in November of
1963 that Esther Glenn would not close her real estate
agreement with Futura on April 1, 1964. However
the Court made and entered the following finding:
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."3. Defendant Lloyd N. Olson, having
the $3,500.00, thereafter turned
said sum, less real estate commission over to
Deve!opment and Investment Corporat10n, knowing that at the time he turned
said money over, said corporation was not ab!
to deliver a good and valid title to plaintiffs.:.
Futura was not under an obligation to delin
title to plaintiff until plaintiffs had paid the entire
balance due under the Uniform Real Estate Contract.

1•

The record and the testimony does not support
the finding previously cited. The only testimony and
evidence on this point supports exactly the opposite
finding that defendant Olson was without knowledg2
of any kind that title would not be available for
delivery by Futura to plaintiff Ross when he paid
the Uniform Real Estate Contract until defendant 1
Olson was notified by Dwight King, attorney dur- j
ing the year 1964, that there was to be a change rn I
the terms of the interst. (R 215)
Accordingly the judgment against the defendant
Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland shoul.o
be reversed as unsupported by any testimony or en·
dence and as being wholly outside of the pleadingi
and the record and having been brought into
,
11
case only during plaintiff's final argument and ; i
the findings and conclusions of law.
!
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CONCLUSION
It could be said :faidy and honestly that the trial
Court concerned over plaintiff's loss of money attempted to allow plaintiff to recover against the
tldendant Olson, real estate broker and the defendant surety company on the g1:ounds of fraud. In
essence the fraud was based upon the failure of a
renclor to fulfil a future promise. Regardless of the
trial Court's concern over plaintiff's loss of money
it was arbitrary and capricious for the trial Court
to enter a judgment against the defendant broker
and the bonding company based upon fraud inasmuch as said judgment is totally unsupported by
the record. Accordingly the judgment should b2
re,'ersed.
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